Abstract. This paper presents a non-equilibrium, agent-based model of workers and firms, with on-thejob searching, endogenous entrepreneurial decisions and endogenous wage and income determination. Workers and firms are heterogeneous, and learn their strategy in the labor market. The model is able to reproduce a number of stylized facts generally accepted in labor economics and industrial organization, such as the Wage, Beveridge and Okun curve, and the skewness of wage, income and firm size distribution. Most interestingly, important stylized facts such as a negatively sloped Wage Curve and a constant returns to scale matching function emerge only out-of-equilibrium, during the adjustment processes toward the stationary state. Thus, from a theoretical point of view the model suggests that taking these stylized facts as "building blocks" of equilibrium models might be misleading. The results stress two additional points. From a methodological point of view, the use of non-equilibrium computational models allows for a more comprehensive investigation of the labor market, by considering the endogenous character of many relevant variables. From an empirical point of view, the joint determination of all aggregate relationships and their dependence on the equilibrium or non-equilibrium state of the system suggest to move from the investigation of empirical regularities in isolation one from the other to a joint analysis.
Introduction
[I]f a model of unemployment conforms to the long-run equilibrium requirements of balanced growth, it is the most suitable starting point for the extensions that will eventually explain unemployment in real economies. (C.A.
Pissarides, Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Preface to the First Edition)
This sentence contains both an act of faith and an admission of weakness. It recognizes that a macroeconomic equilibrium theory of unemployment such as the one described in the very well known book by Pissarides is not able to fully explain "real" unemployment. But it posits that any advance in the task will have to start from the methodological perspective of equilibrium analysis.
The present work aims to show that this may not be the case, and that important insights may be gained by non-equilibrium models. Here, non-equilibrium means that equilibrium is not imposed. Rather, it may emerge from the interaction of all individual behaviors, when some aggregate variables become stationary.
The non-equilibrium model developed in this paper is able to reproduce a number of stylized facts generally accepted in labor economics and industrial organization, such as the Wage, Beveridge and Okun curve, and the skewness of wage, income and firm size distribution. Most interestingly, important stylized facts such as a negatively sloped Wage Curve and a constant returns to scale matching function appear to be robust properties of the system only out-of-equilibrium, during the adjustment processes toward the stationary state.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on unemployment theory. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 describes the computer simulation used to solve it, while section 5 presents the results. In particular, section 5.4 focuses on the stationary state properties of the system, section 5.5 describes the shocks that take the system out of its stationary state and finally section 5.6 deals with the out-of-equilibrium properties during the adjustment processes. Section 6 draws the conclusions and gives indication for future work.
The Literature
In the economic literature, search models have become the standard reference for the analysis of unemployment. They originated from the work by Stigler (1961) on the economics of information, who considered a buyer choosing the number of price quotations before beginning the search process, in order to minimize expected price plus sampling cost. Search models were first applied to labor issues, in a more dynamic perspective, with the work of Phelps et al. (1970) . A surge in this strand of the literature occurred during the eighties, with major contributions by Diamond (1981 Diamond ( , 1982a Diamond ( , 1982b , Mortensen (1982a Mortensen ( , 1982b and Pissarides (1984a Pissarides ( , 1984b . Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , and Pissarides (2000), themselves provide extensive reviews of search models for the labor market. Search models rely on three pillars: the decision of workers, the decision of firms and the wage setting mechanism. Search activity is costly for individuals, who compare the utility of possibly getting a job with their actual utility (which may come from unemployment benefits, or from their present wage if on-the-job searching is allowed), thus computing the equivalent of an arbitrage equation for the valuation of an option (selling their unit of labor) in a perfect capital market. When two-sided search is considered, instead of assuming an exogenous number of vacancies as in simpler models, the search process by firms is explicitly modeled. Vacancy opening is costly for firms. They thus make optimizing choices by comparing expected profits from posting a vacancy with those of leaving the growth opportunity unexploited. In a competitive economy these profits have to be null, allowing for simpler solutions. Wage setting follows two approaches. The most common considers a Nash bargaining solution, while the other approach considers wage posting by the firms. In both cases, a wage must eventually be set. Ideally, wages should also be endogenous, and lead to a
